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Societies now face a grave ethical dilemma in relation to the internet.
Western societies pride themselves on freedom of speech, yet here
we have a medium which has the potential to circumvent the tradi-
tional social controls.1
Late on March 9, 2008, Canadian college student Nadia Kajouji left
the warmth of her Carleton University dorm room, walked to a nearby
bridge, and jumped to her death in the icy Rideau River.2 Six weeks
later, during the spring thaw, her body was found.3 She was not yet
nineteen.4 In the days before her death, Kajouji, who had spiraled into
depression after a romantic breakup and a miscarriage, researched
suicide methods online.5 A forensic search of her computer later re-
vealed that she had asked for advice at the pro-suicide newsgroup
alt.suicide.holiday, writing that she had been depressed for as long as
she could remember, was terrified her suicide attempt would fail, and
wanted a "quick out" with "the highest chance of success."6
Cami, a young and sympathetic nurse, also suicidal, was one of
those who responded. Cami proposed that she and Nadia enter into a
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011; B.A., Columbia University, 1995. The author is a
former member of Lyric Opera of Chicago's young artist program and has sung leading and sec-
ondary roles with various U.S. opera companies. A huge thank you to Professor Steven Heyman
for his invaluable help in conceptualizing this Note, and to Sam Coe and Andrew Jung for their
patience and constructive comments.
** In December 2011, a prepublication draft of this note was made available to the Assis-
tant Rice County Attorney in connection with preparation of the state's appeal brief for State v.
Melchert-Dinkel, filed January 30, 2012.
1. Pierre Baume, Christopher H. Cantor & Andrew Rolfe, Cybersuicide: The Role of Interac-
tive Suicide Notes on the Internet, 18 J. CRISIS INTERVENTION & SUICIDE PREVENTION 73, 78 (1997).
2. Beth Johnston, Man Allegedly Coaxed Canadian's Suicide, OTTAWA SUN, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Crime/2009/02/26/8538881-sun.html.
3. Id.
4. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, slip op. at 15 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
5. Kajouji's Video Diary Shows Path to Suicide, CBC NEWS CANADA,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2009/10/09/ottawa-kajouji-fifth-estate-diary-
suicide.html (last updated Oct. 9, 2009).
6. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, at 15-16.
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suicide pact and tried hard to persuade Nadia to hang herself.7 It was
quick, painless and effective.8 She told Nadia what kind of rope to buy
and where to get it, and said that if Nadia had a web cam, she, Cami,
could watch to make sure that Nadia positioned the rope just right.9
Once Nadia was dead, Cami would hang herself.io
Eventually, the police discovered that "Cami" was one of several
online aliases used by William Melchert-Dinkel, a forty-seven year old
nurse from Minnesota who has characterized himself as having an "ob-
session" with suicide.11 Some two years after Nadia Kajouji died, the
state of Minnesota charged Melchert-Dinkel with two counts of assist-
ed suicide in connection with her death and the 2005 death of Mark
Drybrough, a British man who hanged himself by following detailed
instructions allegedly provided by Melchert-Dinkel in an email.12
In the past decade, thousands of readily-accessible, suicide-related
web sites have proliferated on the internet.13 Many of these sites are
"pro-suicide"-that is, they do not seek to prevent suicide but accept it
as a viable life choice, may facilitate suicide pacts, and may allow the
exchange of detailed information on suicide methods to flow un-
7. Id. at 16-19.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 21.
10. State's Omnibus Brief at 2, Melchert-Dinkel (No. 66-CR-10-1193).
11. Complaint & Statement of Probable Cause at 3, Melchert-Dinkel (No. 66-CR-10-1193).
12. Id. at 1. In March 2011, the trial court convicted Melchert-Dinkel of two counts of assist-
ed suicide under Minnesota Statute 609.215, rejecting the argument that his speech was protect-
ed by the First Amendment. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, at 31-32, 41-42. On November
4, 2011, Melchert-Dinkel filed an appeal with the Minnesota Court of Appeals. He argues that "the
trial court created a new category of prohibited speech, in violation of U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ings." Ex-nurse Appeals Encouraging Suicides Conviction, CBS MINNESOTA.COM, Nov. 4, 2011
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/11/04/ex-nurse-appeals-encouraging-suicides-
conviction/. The case is State v. Melchert-Dinkel. See Minn. App. Ct. Case Mgmt. System,
http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/publicLogin.jsp, Case No. A110987.
13. Adekola 0. Alao et al., Cybersuicide: Review of the Role of the Internet on Suicide, 9
CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAv. 489, 490 (2006) (stating that "[t]here are more than 100,000 web sites on
the internet that deal with methods of committing suicide"); see also Recupero et al., Googling
Suicide: Surfing for Suicide Information on the Internet, 69 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 878, 878 (2008)
(stating that "[t]he internet... features numerous resources for the suicidal person, ranging
broadly from support groups or crisis intervention sites discouraging individuals from commit-
ting suicide to pro-suicide groups and how-to-suicide instructions that would not otherwise be
easily accessible to the average suicidal person"); Lucy Biddle et al., Suicide and the Internet, 336
BRIT. MED. J. 800 (2008). Biddle and her colleagues hypothesized that "most people use [popular]
search engines" and "rarely look beyond the first page of results," and conducted simple searches
for suicide methods using several popular search engines. A review of the first ten hits from each
search yielded 240 discrete sites, ninety of which "were dedicated suicide sites. Half of these were
judged to be encouraging, promoting or facilitating suicide."
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checked through message boards, chats and emails.14 Disturbing as
this is, no current law explicitly prohibits it, even though media reports
and small-scale case studies in the psychiatric literature suggest a di-
rect link between visits to suicide chat rooms and completed sui-
cides.is
This Note will explore how some speech which would otherwise
be punishable currently flourishes unchecked on the internet, thus
"circumvent[ing] [] traditional social controls."16 Application of assist-
ed suicide laws to cyber speech may occur infrequently. But where it
does, punishment of this speech should not automatically be foreclosed
by the First Amendment. Assisted suicide is currently unlawful in the
majority of states, as it has been for hundreds of years in Anglo-
American society. The First Amendment has never protected speech
which is an integral part of criminal conduct,17 and that principle
should not be changed for cyber speech.
Part I of this Note provides background information on suicide-
related cyber space. Part II summarizes relevant First Amendment and
assisted suicide law. Part III analyzes two kinds of suicide-related
cyber speech-encouraging suicide, and assisting or "teaching" suicide
by providing detailed suicide methods-and explores how they fare
under several traditional First Amendment doctrines. It concludes that
suicide-related cyber speech should not be analyzed under the Court's
test for illegal advocacy; rather, speech which counsels or encourages
suicide-including cyber-suicide speech-should be identified as a
traditional category of unprotected speech, or, alternatively, analyzed
under strict scrutiny. Part IV presents a brief conclusion.
14. See, e.g., Recupero, supra note 13, at 879 (noting the existence of "pro-suicide or 'pro-
choice' suicide forums that not only avoid discouraging [users] from suicide, but sometimes go so
far as to provide them with step-by-step suicide instructions or with the necessary means and
encouragement to carry out a suicide attempt."); Baume, supra note 1, at 77 (hypothesizing that
young man participating in suicide newsgroup "may have felt compelled by his internet participa-
tion to follow through with suicide," and positing that "were it not for his public commitments he
might have been able to adopt a more constructive approach to problem-solving without losing
face."). See also About ASH, http://ash2.wikkii.com/wiki/AboutASH (last visited Oct. 4, 2010)
(stating that purpose of the web site is "to provide suicidal people and those suffering from a
severe physical illness with the ability and freedom to make a fair, well-informed and unforced
choice about whether they should live or die.").
15. See generally Brian L. Mishara & David N. Weisstub, Ethical, Legal and Practical Issues in
the Control and Regulation of Suicide Promotion and Assistance over the Internet, 37 SUICIDE & LIFE-
THREATENING BEHAV. 58 (2007) (stating that although anecdotal evidence links visits to suicide
chat rooms with completed suicides, causation issues may limit application of existing assisted
suicide laws to the internet; and noting that there are free speech concerns with controlling
access to suicide chat rooms).
16. Baume, supra note 1.
17. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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1. SUICIDE ON THE INTERNET
Web sites, chat rooms and forums in suicide-related cyber space
are examples of "extreme communities" online. Researcher Vaughan
Bell, who has studied the link between the internet and mental health.
theorizes that because internet speech is uncensored, widely-
separated and formerly-isolated people with "views considered ex-
treme or unacceptable" can now form communities with like-minded
others.18 Some extreme communities are centered on bizarre beliefs or
self-destructive activities.19 Such groups may give members the impe-
tus and information needed to accomplish self-destructive acts that
result in illness, severe injury or death.20
Cyber space is brimming with web sites, newsgroups, message
boards, forums and chat rooms devoted to suicide-related information
and discussions.21 Researchers generally characterize web sites and
chat roomS22 as "pro-suicide" if they seem to be "encouraging, promot-
ing or facilitating suicide."23 Sites categorized as pro-suicide take the
position that all people should have the right to end their lives at any
18. Vaughan Bell, Online Information, Extreme Communities and Internet Therapy: Is the
Internet Good for Our Mental Health?, 16 J. MENTAL HEALTH 445, 449 (2007).
19. Id. at 450. For example, one community of "likely-psychotic" people "reject[s] any medi-
cal explanation of their experiences and instead argue[s] that they are the [sic] subject to 'mind
control' technology."
20. Id. Bell notes the extreme case of "a middle-aged male who self-amputated both legs after
expressing a lifelong desire to be an amputee (a condition named apotemnophilia). The man in
question reported that his participation with other members of an online discussion group (for
those wanting to be amputees) 'deepened his motivation, developed the means, and finalized his
determination to act on his desire."' Id.
21. Alao, supra note 13, at 490; see also Susan Thompson, The Internet and its Potential
Influence on Suicide, 23 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 449 (1999). Speech on pro-suicide web sites and forums
may be roughly divided between non-interactive web site content maintained by a site adminis-
trator, and interactive, user-generated content. Interactive content could include message board
or newsgroup postings, and chat room, forum, text and email messages, e.g., messages of personal
support; general discussion unrelated to suicide; philosophical conversation about suicide; offers
and specific plans to enter into suicide pacts; speech encouraging suicide; and speech which could
assist another in committing suicide by providing specific details on suicide methods.
22. This Note uses the term "web site" to refer to non-interactive internet sites where infor-
mation and links are posted. Although there are technically differences among them, I use the
terms "chat room," "newsgroup," "message board," and "forum" somewhat interchangeably to
refer to sites where users can interact with each other, either by posting messages that others can
reply to at their leisure, or in real time chats.
23. See, e.g., Biddle, supra note 13, at 800. See also Recupero, supra note 13, at 882. Recupero
and her colleagues studied the availability and type of suicide-related sites on the internet; they
found that approximately 11% of sites reviewed had "a pro-suicide bias or slant," approximately
31% were "neutral" or balanced between pro- and anti-suicide views, and 29% were suicide-
prevention or anti-suicide sites. The numbers do not total 100% because 9% of the sites would
not load and 20% of the sites were only peripherally related to suicide "(eg [sic], rock band's
homepage, movie or novel with suicide in the title)."
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time, regardless of whether they are terminally ill,24 and may post
"methods files" containing detailed instructions on how to commit
suicide.25 In addition, "how-to" information may be traded on message
boards, in private chats or in emailS.26 As a result, anyone can easily
access suicide methods online, either by asking for advice and infor-
mation on suicide forums or by searching "methods files" archived on a
web site or 'wiki.'27 For example, one young woman sought and re-
ceived tips from members of a suicide forum enabling her to pose as
jeweler and purchase poison that she later used to kill herself.28 In
another case, a young husband came home to find his wife dead and
the computer still on, with detailed instructions on hanging still up on
the screen.29
Although there are many reported case studies and newspaper ar-
ticles linking individual suicides to participation in suicide chat rooms
or to detailed suicide methods information posted on web sites, there
is no evidence which conclusively supports this.3o However, given the
"near-ubiquitous" internet use in adolescents and young adults as well
as a significant suicide rate in these age groups, it is easy to see why
mental health professionals are alarmed.31 Perhaps the strongest of
24. About ASH, supra note 14 (stating that purpose of the web site is "to provide suicidal
people and those suffering from a severe physical illness with the ability and freedom to make a
fair, well-informed and unforced choice about whether they should live or die.").
25. See, e.g., Archive, ALT.SUICIDE.METHODS, http://archive.ashspace.org/asm-guide/ (last
visited Nov. 28, 2011). To access, go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alt.suicide.holiday, scroll to
External Links section, click on link for ashspace.org (http://ashspace.org/), scroll down, and
click on link for alt.suicide.methods reference.
26. See., e.g., Alao, supra note 13 (discussing availability of suicide information in chat rooms
and web sites); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, slip op. at 6-25 (D. Minn.
Mar. 15, 2011) (detailing email correspondence and chat room conversations between William
Melchert-Dinkel and victims Nadia Kajouji and Mark Drybrough). Forensic searches of Kajouji's
and Drybrough's computers showed that after they posted requests for advice on killing them-
selves online, Melchert-Dinkel communicated with them via chat rooms and email.
27. See, e.g., Archive, supra note 25.
28. Ellen Luu, Note, Web-Assisted Suicide and the First Amendment, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
307, 308 (2009).
29. Id.
30. Ajit Shah, The Relationship Between General Population Suicide Rates and the Internet: A
Cross-National Study, 40 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 146, 147 (2010). Shah conducted a
broad-based study which attempted to correlate the prevalence of a country's internet users with
its general suicide rates. He reviewed data from seventy-five countries, and concluded that there
was a positive correlation for both sexes (i.e., that countries with the highest percentage of inter-
net users also had the highest suicide rates). However, he cautioned that more research was
needed before drawing conclusions on causality. Id. at 149.
31. A December 2009 survey by Pew Research Organization found that 74% of all Americans
use the internet Among Americans 30-49, the figure is 81%; among young adults 18-29, that
figure rises to 93%. Lee Rainie, Internet, Broadband and Cell Phone Statistics 2, PEW INTERNET &




their concerns is the presence of "vulnerable populations"-minors
and persons with psychiatric disorders-with uncontrolled access to
pro-suicide web sites.32 In these sites, suicide may be encouraged or
taken for granted as a rational problem-solving method.33 The sites-
or the users themselves-may prohibit or reject messages discourag-
ing suicide,34 thus creating an unbalanced environment that could trig-
ger suicidal behavior in a vulnerable person.35 Sometimes, discussion
begun in online chats or message boards is continued in private emails.
For example, in response to a posting by Mark Drybrough requesting
"details of hanging methods where there isn't access to anything high
up to tie the rope to," William Melchert-Dinkel sent Drybrough several
emails with detailed information on how to successfully hang himself.
36
Suicide chat rooms also serve as meeting places for individuals
who want to enter into suicide pacts.37 The resulting number of sui-
cides seems to be increasing: In the past ten years, multiple deaths
Among teens 12-17, the figure is also 93%. Amanda Lenhart, Kristen Purcell, Aaron Smith &
Kathryn Zickuhr, Social Media and Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young Adults 4 PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://pewinternet.com/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIPSocialMedia-andYoung-AdultsRe
portFinal with-toplines.pdf (figures for teens 12-17 as of September 2009). According to the
American Association of Suicidology, the 2007 suicide rate for all Americans was 11.5 deaths per
100,000 persons. Suicide in the U.S.A. Based on Current (2007) Statistics, AM. AssoC. SUICIDOLOGY
(2010), http://www.suicidology.org/c/documentlibrary/get file?folderd=232&name=DLFE-
244.pdf. Suicide is the third leading cause of death among those 15-24, accounting for 12.2% of
all deaths in that age group. Youth Suicide Fact Sheet 1, AM. Assoc. SUICIDOLOGY (2010),
http://211bigbend.net/PDFs/YouthSuicideFactSheetpdf. One out of every twelve college stu-
dents has made a suicide plan, and at least 1,000 of them follow through annually. Id. at 4. Even
younger children are not immune: In 2007, the deaths of 119 American children between the ages
of ten and fourteen were attributed to suicide. Id. at 2. Most adolescents who kill themselves do so
at home after school. Id. at 3.
32. Mishara, supra note 15, at 63.
33. About ASH, supra note 14. See also Rebecca Sinderbrand, Q&A: 'Groups Like Ours Will
Always Exist, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Nat'l Aff., June 24, 2003, available at LEXIS (quoting SR-
71A, administrator of ASH Web site, as saying that "[tihe main purpose of the site is rational, open
discussion about suicide, with an emphasis on individual liberty and autonomy.").
34. Baume, supra note 1, at 75; Thompson, supra note 21, at 450 (noting that the newsgroup
altsuicide.holiday "specifies that messages of discouragement or religious disapproval will not be
tolerated.").
35. See, e.g., Recupero, supra note 13, at 879 (noting the concern that "pro-suicide attitudes
endorsed by groups in chat rooms or online suicide forums may lead vulnerable individuals
ambivalent about suicide to decide to attempt suicide rather than to seek help"). But see
Sinderbrand, supra note 33 (quoting SR-71A as saying that "[t]he media presents suicide cases as
if they have been caused by online forums. In reality, if you have a forum of suicidal people then
some will commit suicide, regardless of the subject. The real question is whether the rate of
suicide on online forums is less or greater than the rate of suicide for people who are suicidal yet
do not have or find access to such forums.").
36. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, slip op. at 7-14 (D. Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
37. Mishara, supra note 15, at 59.
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have been reported in Asia and Europe as a result of suicide pacts orig-
inating online.38 Perhaps more frightening-if less common-is the
existence of online predators in suicide forums. William Melchert-
Dinkel told police that "he most likely encouraged dozens of persons to
commit suicide, and characterized it as the thrill of the chase."39
Melchert-Dinkel seems almost benign compared to Gerald Krein, who
was charged in 2005 with solicitation to commit murder when he tried
to set up a Valentine's Day mass suicide online.40 In contrast, however,
some researchers believe that suicide forums can actually offer posi-
tive benefits for suicidal people,41 and some suicide forum users have
reported finding a valuable sense of support and community.42
38. Id. One source reports that between 2003 and 2005, "180 people died in 61 reported
cases of Internet-assisted group suicide in Japan." David Samuels, Let's Die Together: Why is Anon-
ymous Group Suicide so Popular in Japan, ATLANTIC (May 2007),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/05/let-8217-s-die-together/5776/. In
England, one seventeen-year-old entered into a suicide pact with girls she met in a suicide forum
and successfully completed suicide. Jonathan Owen, Teens Die After Logging into 'Suicide Chat
Rooms,' INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-
britain/teens-die-after-logging-into-suicide-chat-rooms-415386.html. In 2003, a Scottish man
who entered into a suicide pact with a stranger he met online was charged with aiding and abet-
ting suicide. Mishara, supra note 15, at 59.The Scot was talked out of killing himself at the last
minute, but his companion completed suicide. Id.
39. Statement of Probable Cause, supra note 11, at 4.
40. Mishara, supra note 15, at 59; Rukmini Callimachi, Man has History of Trying to Organize
Suicides, Police Say, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2059229.
41. See, e.g., Darren Baker & Sarah Fortune, Understanding Self-Harm and Suicide Web Sites,
29 CRISIS 118, 119 (2008) (noting the tendency of researchers to ignore the positive aspects of
suicide web sites unless they are "the right sort of web sites, such as those which advise acutely
suicidal people to seek professional help.") (emphasis in original).
42. Id. See also Sinderbrand, supra note 33 (quoting SR-71A as saying that "1, personally, am
alive because of the existence of the site and the channel. Being accepted by persons intrinsically
understanding my thoughts and emotional pain made it much easier to talk about them."); Chris-
tiane Eichenberg, Internet Message Boards for Suicidal People: A Typology of Users, 11
CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAv. 107, 108 (2008). To assess whether suicide forums are actually harmful,
Eichenberg studied 164 users of a popular German suicide forum. Using a detailed questionnaire,
she identified three user types. Type 1, the "ambivalent help-seeking" group, comprised 21% of
the sample. These users had the highest level of destructive (i.e. suicidal) motives, but also sought
to participate in the forum for constructive reasons. Type 2, the "unspecifically motivated type,"
comprised 31% of the sample. These users were not strongly focused "on themselves or on others
in connection with suicidal problems." Type 3, the "constructive help-seeker" group, comprised
48% of the sample. These users had virtually no destructive motives and were constructively
motivated to seek and provide support with others sharing similar thoughts and feelings. Thus,
Eichenberg concluded that for the large majority of users, this suicide forum appeared to provide





A. Suicide and Assisted Suicide
Opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of as-
sisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philo-
sophical, legal, and cultural heritages.43
Assisted suicide is a criminal offense in the majority of states, as it
has been for hundreds of years in Western society.44 At common law,
those who encouraged or assisted a suicide were viewed as principals
in the second degree if they were present at the suicide, and as acces-
sories before the fact if they were not.4s The Model Penal Code crimi-
nalizes assisted suicide because of the potential deterrent effect.46
Moreover, a law permitting a person to take another's life, even with
consent, would threaten the state's interests in protecting "the sanctity
of life," and would be inconsistent with laws criminalizing homicide.47
In contrast, suicide is no longer a statutory crime in the United
States,48 although it is still considered wrongful.49 The decriminaliza-
tion of suicide occurred gradually. In sixteenth-century England, sui-
cide was considered "an Offence against Nature, against God, and
against the King"5o; it was a felony punishable by "ignominious burial"
and forfeiture of one's land and goods to the Crownsi; and was consid-
ered a form of murder.52 The same approach was adopted in the early
American colonies; however, common-law penalties were abandoned
over time as states acknowledged the futility of imposing sanctions on
the suicide and her family.53 The last U.S. conviction for attempted
suicide occurred in North Carolina in 196154; the last U.S. statute rec-
43. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997).
44. Id.
45. Catherine D. Shaffer, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 348, 349
(1986).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) cmt. at 100 (1980).
47. Id.
48. Shaffer, supra note 45, at 348. Suicide is still a common law crime or a crime of moral
turpitude in a tiny minority of states, but it is rarely, if ever, punished. See 83 C.J.S. Suicide § 5
(2010).
49. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 714. An action is unlawful, or "wrongful" in this sense when it is
"contrary to moral standards." SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3446 (6th ed. 2007). This Note
assumes that suicide is unlawful (contrary to moral standards) but not illegal.
50. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 712, n.10 (quoting Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowd. Com. 253, 261, 75 Eng.
Rep. 387, 400 (1561-1562)).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) cmt. at 91-92.
52. Id. at 92, nn.1-2.
53. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713.
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2) cmt. at 94, n.11 and accompanying text.
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ognizing attempted suicide as a crime was repealed in 1976 by the
state of Oklahoma.ss Similarly, the Model Penal Code does not crimi-
nalize suicide56; according to the drafters, the threat of punishment is
unlikely to deter someone from taking her own life.57
The decriminalization of suicide has led some people to call for the
decriminalization of assisted suicide. Most of the debate has centered
in the area of physician assisted suicide. In 1997, the Supreme Court
upheld two assisted suicide laws against constitutional challenges.
Both cases arose in the context of end-of-life considerations for termi-
nally ill, suffering people. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the respondents,
physicians who wanted to assist these patients in ending their lives,
sought a declaratory judgment that Washington's assisted suicide stat-
ute was unconstitutional on its face.58 They argued that a mentally
competent, terminally ill person's right to choose physician-assisted
suicide is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.59 In VQCCO v. Quill, the petitioners, also physicians, argued that
New York's assisted suicide law violated the Equal Protection Clause,
because terminally ill patients on life support had the right to refuse or
terminate life-saving medical treatment, while all other terminally ill
patients were denied the right to active assistance in ending their
lives.6o
The Court rejected both arguments, holding in Glucksberg that the
right to assistance in suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment,61 and holding in Vacco that be-
cause the right to refuse or terminate life-saving medical treatment can
be distinguished from the right to active assistance in ending one's life,
assisted suicide laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.62
In rejecting the claimants' arguments, the Court reaffirmed the
State's strong interests in preserving life and protecting vulnerable
people from harm, while clarifying that the individual's constitutional
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment is qualitatively
different from a right to assistance in committing suicide. The Court
grounded its analysis of both issues in America's history and tradi-
55. Id. at n.10.
56. Id. at 93.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707-708.
59. Id. at 708.
60. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
61. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-706.
62. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 796-797.
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tion.63 It explained that assisted suicide bans "are longstanding expres-
sions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of
human life,"64 deeply rooted in 700 years of "Anglo-American com-
mon-law tradition."65 While noting that suicide is no longer harshly
punished,66 it explained that the lessening of penalties for suicides had
resulted, not from any acceptance of suicide, but from a "growing con-
sensus" that harsh sanctions do not deter suicides and are unfair to the
survivors.67
The Court noted that attitudes toward assisted suicide had not un-
dergone a similar transformation. Although advancements in medical
technology have prompted many states to reexamine their assisted
suicide bans and enact Death with Dignity acts,6a almost all states con-
tinue to criminalize assisted suicide.69 Thus, in view of the "consistent
and almost universal tradition that has long rejected [assisted sui-
cide] ... and continues explicitly to reject it today," assisted suicide is
not a fundamental liberty interest, and Washington's law does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment.70 "To hold for respondents," the Court
added, "we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and prac-
tice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every
State."71
In sum, after Glucksberg and Vacco, it is clear that states have a
fundamental interest in protecting life, that suicide, though no longer a
statutory crime, is still "unlawful" in a moral sense, and that there is a
long-standing, Anglo-American tradition which disapproves of suicide
and assisted suicide. In First Amendment jurisprudence, similar tradi-
tions determine whether speech is protected or wholly unprotected.72
63. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710 ("We begin, as we do in all due-process cases, by examining
our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."). In Vacco, handed down the same day, the
Court did not engage in an extended historical analysis. Rather, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
wrote both opinions, incorporated the Glucksberg analysis by reference. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 796,
n.1.
64. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
65. Id.at711.
66. Id. at 713.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 716.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 723.
71. Id.
72. In preparing the following overview of First Amendment law, the author referred to
materials prepared by Professor Steven J. Heyman in 2009 (on file with the author) as well as the
references cited below.
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B. The First Amendment
1. Overview
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of the speech."73 It protects expressive
conduct as well as spoken and written wordS,74 and it covers political,
social, artistic, literary, and other forms of speech. Although Justice
Black considered this language "absolute,"75 in practice, the Court has
"consistently held" that it is subject to interpretation, and that the
freedom of speech may be restrained "'for appropriate reasons."'76
Scholars cite three major rationales underlying the Court's free-
dom of speech jurisprudence.77 First, the search for truth is best
"reached by free trade in ideas" rather than by repressing bad ideas.78
Second, in a democracy, all citizens must be able to criticize the gov-
ernment and freely express their views, no matter how unpopular.79
Third, government limitations on speech can "[stunt] people's lives,
their abilities to define and express who they are," and "[impoverish]
the national culture."so
First Amendment analysis distinguishes between content-based
and content-neutral regulations, and employs a dizzying variety of
tests to review them. A law which is enacted to regulate conduct that
has an incidental impact on speech is considered content-neutral. A
law which is enacted to regulate speech because of what it communi-
cates is a content-based regulation.
Historically, the content of some speech was considered of such
"low value" that it was outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment.81 Categories of unprotected speech included obscenity, libel,
73. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
74. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989).
75. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (3d ed. 2008) (quoting Hugo L. Black,
The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874, 879 (1960)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 8-13.
78. Id. at 9 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting)). Holmes wrote that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market"
79. Id. at 11 (discussing the work of Alexander Meiklejohn: "'the vital point... is that no
suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than
another. [Citizens] may not be barred [from speaking] because their views are thought to be false
or dangerous.... When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger."'). See also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 5 (2d ed. 2003).
80. FARBER, supra note 79, at 3-4.
81. See Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942).
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true threats, fighting words and illegal advocacy.82 However, in the
past forty years the Court has adopted an extremely speech-protective
stance, and now accords protection even to some "low value" speech.83
As a result, the government is generally prohibited from discriminating
against speech based on its content or the viewpoint expressed, with
two exceptions.84 First, the constitutionality of laws regulating low-
value speech may be upheld under tests developed by the Court. Se-
cond, even speech which is normally accorded full First Amendment
protection may be regulated if the government can demonstrate that
the law is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state
interest.8s
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court significantly increased protec-
tion for one category of low-value speech, illegal advocacy,86 with far-
reaching consequences. The Brandenburg test states that the govern-
ment cannot "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation" unless it is "directed to initiating or producing imminent
lawless action" and is likely to produce it.87 Brandenburg concerned
political advocacy-specifically, advocacy of violence against the gov-
ernment to effect political change. However, because the Court did not
precisely define the limits of "advocacy," lower courts have since ap-
plied the Brandenburg test to a broad variety of cases where speech
advocates, encourages, or aids and abets an unlawful action. Neverthe-
less, because the imminence prong of Brandenburg is difficult to satisfy
outside the context of public, political speech, some courts have de-
clined to apply it in other contexts.
In keeping with the Court's speech-protective stance, it has rarely
acknowledged new categories of low-value speech. However, in 1982 it
announced in New York v. Ferber that child pornography was unpro-
tected as a category.88 How does the Court decide that a certain cate-
gory of speech is unprotected? Its statement in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire gives some guidance. In Chaplinsky, the Court noted that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and all circum-
stances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
82. Id.at572.
83. FARBER, supra note 79, at 1.
84. Id.at2l.
85. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210-211 (1992) (holding that law prohibiting political
campaigning within 100 feet of polls did not violate First Amendment).
86. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also infra Part III.A.
87. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
88. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
680 [Vol 87:2
CYBER SUICIDE SPEECH AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.89
Two things are notable about the Court's comment. First, it sug-
gested that low-value speech represents a societal balancing act, a con-
cept which has since been firmly rejected.9o Second, in indicating that
the regulation of low-value speech "ha[d] never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem,"91 the Court implied that it was merely
stating a principle long-since recognized at common law and by earlier
courts.
The Court elaborated on both of these concepts in United States v.
Stevens. In Stevens, the Court rejected the government's argument that
the test for First Amendment protection "depends upon a categorical
balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs."92 It ex-
plained that its previous references to a First Amendment balancing
test were merely descriptive93; the decision in Ferber to ban porno-
graphic images of children resulted, not from the slight social value of
the speech itself, but from the direct harm suffered by the child and the
state's compelling interest in preventing abuse.94 Moreover, the Court
said, its holding in Ferber was firmly grounded in "a previously recog-
nized, long-established category of unprotected speech" that is "used
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."95
In concluding his discussion, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the
Court might yet identify new "categories of speech that have been his-
torically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or
discussed as such in our case law."96 Thus, Stevens teaches that one of
the defining characteristics of unprotected speech is its historically
disfavored status.
89. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942).
90. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585-1586 (2010).
91. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-572.
92. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.






2. Speech in Cyber Space
Speech in cyber space raises special concerns. The Court heard its
first internet-related First Amendment case, Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, in 1997.97 In Reno, the Court struck down a federal
statute intended to protect minors from obscene or indecent speech on
the internet.98 The Court held that although the government's interest
was compelling, the challenged provisions of the Communications De-
cency Act (CDA) violated the First Amendment because they were
overly broad, had a chilling effect on adult internet speech, and bur-
dened an adult's right to receive legal information.99 Because internet
filtering and blocking software represented less restrictive alterna-
tives, the CDA was unconstitutional.loo
The Court analyzed the CDA under traditional First Amendment
principles. It explained that the factors which had historically justified
heavy regulation of the broadcast industry, such as a "scarcity of avail-
able frequencies" and "its 'invasive' nature," were not present on the
internet.io The Court further explained that unlike radio or television,
the internet is not "invasive" or intrusive.102 Because users are re-
quired to seek out content, harmful material does not appear by acci-
dent.103
The Court did not have occasion to consider anonymous speech
on the internet, which has changed the way people communicate with
each other. Thus, it could not have anticipated the harm that can some-
times result from participation in extreme communities104 or social
networking sites such as MySpace. For example, in 2006, thirteen-year
old Megan Meier committed suicide after being harassed by "a teenage
mob" on MySpace.ios An eighteen-year-old boy named Josh told Megan
that "the world would be better off without her," and she apparently
agreed.106 Weeks later, her family learned that Josh was not a real boy
but the fictional creation of Lori Drew, a neighbor who lived four hous-
97. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997).
98. Id. at 849.
99. Id. at 875.
100. Id. at 877.
101. Id. at 868-869.
102. Id. at 869.
103. Id.
104. See supra Part I.
105. Sarah Jameson, Comment, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and
Privacy, 17 COMMLAw CONSPECTUs 231, 231 (2008).
106. Betsy Taylor, Missouri Prosecutor: Law Doesn'tAllowfor Charges in MySpace Teen Suicide
Case, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Dec. 4, 2007, available at WL 12/4/07 APWORLD 00:00:55.
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es away.1o7 Because Megan and Drew's daughter Sarah were no longer
friends, Drew allegedly wanted to find out what Megan was saying
about Sarah.lo8 No federal internet law explicitly prohibited Drew's
alleged behavior, and because it did not rise to the level of stalking or
harassment in Missouri, no criminal charges were filed.109 It is doubt-
ful that an adult woman would have engaged in such speech if her
identity had been known to the minor and the minor's family.
In sum, the Court's decision in Reno and the cautionary tale of Me-
gan Meier together illustrate the difficulties of regulating harmful
speech on the internet. In Reno, the Court clearly stated that the gov-
ernment cannot totally ban speech on the internet that is lawful for
adults, even where the government has a compelling interest in pre-
venting harm to vulnerable minors. Moreover, because cyber bullying
is a new phenomenon, there were no laws under which Lori Drew
could properly be charged. In contrast, it may be possible to apply ex-
isting assisted suicide laws like Minnesota's to prohibit online speech
which assists or encourages people to commit suicide.
III. ANALYSIS
This analysis will focus on two kinds of suicide-related cyber
speech-speech which assists or "teaches" suicide by providing de-
tailed information on suicide methods, and speech which encourages
suicide. Although the analysis is not state-specific, it uses Minnesota's
assisted suicide law-which punishes anyone who aids a suicide by
"intentionally advis[ing], encourag[ing], or assist[ing] another in taking
the other's own life"no-as a model for a hypothetical assisted suicide
statute in the State of X.111 The analysis also assumes that State X has
decriminalized suicide.
107. Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should Anti-
Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. I.L. & Tech. 323, 324 (2008).
108. Taylor, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. Minn. Stat. § 609.215 (2011). The Melchert-Dinkel Court has construed this statute to
require imminence. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, slip op. at 32-33 (D. Minn. Mar.
15, 2011).The State X statute has not been similarly narrowed.
111. It should be noted that in some states, laws prohibit "aiding" suicide, while in other
states, laws prohibit "assisting," "soliciting," or "encouraging" suicide. Minnesota defines aiding
suicide to encompass advising, encouraging or assisting a person to commit suicide. At least six
states define assistance to require "providing the physical means" or participating in the "physical
act" Wayne R. LaFave, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 15.6, n.29 (2d ed 2010). Thus, this analysis
would not apply in states which require physical assistance of some sort.
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Part IIl.A explores the parallels between speech which assists sui-
cide and speech which aids and abets crimes. It concludes that speech
which is an integral part of a criminal action is not protected, and that
because a state can constitutionally outlaw assisting suicide, it can do
so whether the assistance comes in the form of speech or conduct. Part
III.B first considers what issues arise if speech which encourages sui-
cide is analyzed under the Brandenburg test. Next, it argues that Bran-
denburg is not the appropriate standard for analyzing speech which
encourages suicide. It then argues that under United States v. Stevens,
speech which encourages suicide is a traditional, unprotected category
of speech. Finally, it argues that even if speech which encourages sui-
cide is not a category of unprotected speech, an assisted suicide statute
as applied to cyber speech should be upheld under strict scrutiny be-
cause of the state's compelling interests in preserving life, preventing
suicide, and protecting vulnerable persons from abuse.
It should be noted that this analysis does not consider the First
Amendment doctrines of overbreadth or vagueness.112 In addition, it
does not consider ideological discussions related to suicide-such as
whether suicide is a rational choice in response to life's problems-
because it assumes they are protected speech under the First Amend-
ment.
A. Speech Which Assists or "Teaches" Suicide
Suppose that A, who lives in State X, responds to a forum posting
by B, who indicates that she is suicidal, wants a quick and painless
death, and asks for advice and information. A sends B an email
"advis[ing] her to use morphine for a painless death, [explaining] how
to falsify a prescription to buy the drug, the dose needed, and how to
find a secluded place to avoid someone trying to save her."113 B follows
A's instructions, successfully purchases the correct dose of morphine,
and completes suicide in a secluded place.114 Without the information
in A's email, B would have not have known what dose to use, or how to
successfully falsify the morphine prescription. Therefore, A has aided
112. The Melchert-Dinkel Court ruled that Minnesota's assisted suicide statute is not unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to internet speech, because the language is clear and unambiguous,
and an ordinary person would know what conduct it prohibits. Omnibus Order & Memorandum,
Melchert-Dinkel, No. 66-CR-10-1193, at 15.
113. These facts are taken from a French case. See Prison Sought in French Internet Suicide
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B's suicide by assisting, or "teaching" her how to commit suicide by
falsifying a prescription and buying the correct dose of morphine.
If A is charged with assisting suicide in connection with B's death,
he will probably argue that his expression is protected by the First
Amendment. Specifically, A is likely to argue that assisting suicide is a
form of encouragement, or advocacy, and that he cannot be held re-
sponsible for B's suicide unless all elements of the Brandenburg test for
illegal advocacy are met.1ls However, this is not the case.
Every court which has considered the question of a defendant's
criminal liability for aiding others in the commission of a crime has
concluded that the defendant's speech is not categorically protected by
the First Amendment.116 These courts have found Brandenburg inap-
plicable where the speech itself constitutes the aiding and abetting-
that is, where it is "simply means to get a crime successfully commit-
ted."117
Justice Black first outlined the contours of this "speech-act doc-
trine" in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.118 In Giboney, the Court
considered whether the First Amendment protected "peaceful" picket-
ing by a labor union, which was trying to force an ice manufacturer to
stop selling ice to non-union peddler.119 The ice manufacturer, Em-
pire, charged that the union's actions violated Missouri's restraint of
trade laws.120 The union argued that because it was merely trying to
publicize true facts about the labor dispute, its picketing was protected
expression under the First Amendment.121 The Court disagreed, find-
ing that the union's speech was part of "a single and integrated course
of conduct" aimed at violating Missouri's valid law, and holding that
the First Amendment does not protect "speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."122 The
Court added that if speech incidental to illegal conduct was protected,
the government would find it impossible to punish many of "the most
115. See infra Part IlI.B.
116. Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997).
117. Id.
118. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,502 (1949).
119. Id. at 491-492.
120. Id. at 493.
121. Id. at 497-498.
122. Id. at 498.
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pernicious criminal acts and civil wrongs,"123 such as solicitation,
threats, bribery, perjury, harassment and forgery.124
The Court has affirmed the principle set forth in Giboney many
times,12s and lower courts have applied it in a variety of criminal aid-
ing and abetting cases.126 Where defendants have been charged with
aiding and abetting a crime through speech or writing, these courts
have distinguished Brandenburg, holding that the defendant's speech is
not categorically protected by the First Amendment.127
For example, in United States v. Buttorff the defendants were
charged with aiding and abetting tax fraud by conducting public semi-
nars where they encouraged others to file fraudulent tax returns and
avoid paying taxes.128 The Eighth Circuit held that the First Amend-
ment did not automatically bar prosecution because
[a]lthough the speeches here do not incite the type of imminent law-
less activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants
did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They explained how to
avoid withholding and their speeches and explanations incited sev-
eral individuals to activity that violated federal law.129
The court reached this conclusion despite the apparent ideological
basis for the defendants' speeches.13o Moreover, although the defend-
ants were not personally involved in preparing any false returns (and
in fact, did not even know whether any false returns had been filed),
people had testified to preparing false tax returns as a result of attend-
ing the meetings.131
In United States v. Barnett, the Ninth Circuit relied on Buttorff in
holding that the First Amendment did not shield Barnett from liability
for aiding and abetting illegal drug manufacture.132 In Barnett, police
searching the home of Hensley, who operated a PCP factory, found
material Hensley had ordered by mail from Barnett, including instruc-
tions for the "Synthesis of PCP-Preparation of Angel Dust" and infor-
mation on where to buy necessary ingredient.133 When police later
123. Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997).
124. Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 244-246.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1978).
129. Id. at 624.
130. Id. at 622 (noting testimony recalling that defendants' speeches dealt mainly with "the
Constitution, the Bible, and the unconstitutionality of the graduated income tax.").
131. Id. at 623.
132. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835,842-843 (9th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 838.
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searched Barnett's home, they found documents for his mail-order
business, which consisted of supplying instructions for manufacturing
illegal drugs and information on where to buy the raw materials.134
Barnett's sole contact with Hensley was through the mail, and he ar-
gued that the warrant failed to state facts sufficient to connect him to
the illegal conduct. However, the court disagreed, finding sufficient
evidence to sustain a charge of aiding and abetting the manufacture of
illegal drugs.135 It rejected Barnett's claim that the seized items-
printed instructions for making illegal drugs-were protected by the
First Amendment simply because they consisted of printed words,136
and noted that if someone aids and abets a crime that is later carried
out, it is irrelevant how much time elapses from the time the principal
receives the instructions or advice and the time she actually commits
the crime.137
At least one court has extended the speech-act doctrine to a civil
case. In Rice v. Paladin, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Barnett in
holding that the First Amendment did not shield Paladin, the publisher
of the book Hit Man, from civil liability for aiding and abetting mur-
der.138 Rice, a wrongful death suit brought against Paladin, alleged that
James Perry had committed three brutal murders by closely following
Hit Man's explicit instructions for becoming "a professional killer."139
For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, Paladin stipulated
that in marketing Hit Man, it had targeted would-be killers; that it had
known and intended that the book's explicit instructions for becoming
"a professional killer" would immediately aid and abet murderers; and
that it had aided and abetted Perry in committing three murder.140
Since the facts stipulated to by Paladin were sufficient as a matter
of law to establish its liability, the sole issue before the court was
whether the First Amendment was an absolute bar to imposing that
liability.141 The district court, applying Brandenburg, granted Paladin's
summary judgment motion, and held that Hit Man was protected
speech under the First Amendment.142 The Fourth Circuit reversed.
134. Id.at840.
135. Id. at 841.
136. Id. at 842. ("The First Amendment does not provide a defense to a criminal charge simply
because the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose.").
137. Id. at 841.
138. Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-243 (4th Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 241. Perry had already been convicted of the murders in a criminal trial.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 250.
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Judge Luttig acknowledged the importance of the freedoms protected
by Brandenburg143 However, he rejected the application of Branden-
burg to the case before him, reasoning that where the defendant inten-
tionally aided and abetted murder for commercial gain, those freedoms
were not implicated.144
Because Justice Luttig found Barnett "indistinguishable in princi-
ple" from the case before him, he chose to rely primarily on criminal
aiding and abetting law in his analysis, reasoning that the principles
were equally applicable to civil cases.145 Like Barnett, Paladin's only
contact with the criminal occurred when it responded to his order and
payment by mailing printed material. However, this material consisted
of detailed, highly specific written instructions which assisted or
"taught" the criminal how to commit the particular crime. If the First
Amendment did not bar punishment of Barnett's speech-act in a crimi-
nal case, Judge Luttig concluded that there was no reason why it could
not be applied in a civil context.146
Judge Luttig also noted that consistent with the position of these
courts, the Department of Justice had advised Congress that Branden-
burg, and the "imminence requirement in particular," was not applica-
ble to criminal aiding and abetting, because an aiding and abetting
charge is not directed to advocacy of criminal conduct, "but on defend-
ants' successful efforts to assist others by" instructing them in commit-
ting a crime.147 Thus, Justice Luttig concluded that the First
Amendment was not an absolute bar to Paladin's liability for the
wrongful death suit.148
In sum, Giboney and the cases that rely on it teach that the First
Amendment does not bar enforcement of valid criminal laws simply
because speech might somehow be implicated, and that courts consid-
ering aiding and abetting cases involving speech may properly analyze
them under the principles announced in Giboney rather than applying
the Brandenburg test. Moreover, several courts have concluded that a
lack of personal contact or a gap in time from receipt of instructions to
143. Id. at 243.
144. Id. at 242-243.
145. Id. at 244-247 (discussing the speech-act doctrine in criminal aiding and abetting cases,
and concluding that if the First Amendment does not bar liability for speech acts in criminal cases,
there is no reason not to extend the principle to civil cases).
146. Id. at 247-248. The court did note that a heightened intent requirement might apply in
civil cases, but felt that it would be met on the facts before it. Id
147. Id. at 246 (quoting DEP'T OF JUSTICE 1997 REP. ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFO., at
37 (Apr. 1997)).
148. Id. at 243.
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the commission of the crime does not invalidate a charge of aiding and
abetting.
A would probably argue that speech which assists suicide is dis-
tinguishable from speech which aids and abets criminal actions for one
critical reason: suicide is not an illegal action in State X. Because sui-
cide is not illegal, an aiding and abetting analysis should not apply, and
punishment of A's speech should be foreclosed by the First Amend-
ment.
In this case, A would be wrong because he aided and abetted B in
falsifying a prescription for a controlled substance, which is surely
unlawful. Therefore, A would probably be charged with aiding and
abetting B's illegal drug purchase, and A's action would fall squarely
within the bounds of aiding and abetting cases as exemplified by Bar-
nett. Since the end result of B's illegal action was B's suicide, A's speech
would not be protected by the First Amendment.
Now assume instead that A sends B an email with very detailed
instructions on how to successfully hang herself. Specifically, A's email
details the exact kind of rope B should buy, exactly how to tie the knot,
and exactly where B should place the rope around her neck to assure
that she dies quickly and with the least possible discomfort.
Since completing suicide via hanging is not illegal, A's speech does
not fall within the aiding and abetting category exemplified by Barnett.
However, A's contention that his speech is protected can be addressed
in two different ways. First, a court might consider that suicide, though
no longer a statutory crime, is still considered "wrongful" in Western
society.149 Suicide was not decriminalized because the practice of kill-
ing oneself became acceptable, but out of respect for the suicide's fami-
ly.15o If suicide were not still in some way "wrongful," assisted suicide
would not be criminalized. Therefore, a court might find that suicide is
a morally wrong, "quasi-unlawful" act, and an aiding and abetting anal-
ysis could properly be applied, with the result that A's speech would
not be protected by the First Amendment.
A court unwilling to stretch the concept of an unlawful act to en-
compass suicide as a wrongful, quasi-unlawful act, could instead con-
sider that although the principle announced in Giboney has been
applied to cases of aiding and abetting criminal actions, it is not limited
to cases of criminal aiding and abetting. In fact, there is nothing in
149. See supra note 49.
150. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 713 (1997).
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Giboney which requires one person's speech to aid and abet another
person in completing an illegal action. Giboney simply says that speech
which is an integral part of criminal conduct is not protected. Thus, if a
state has enacted a valid criminal law of general applicability, it can
punish violations of that law whether the violation occurs as conduct
or speech.
Since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of assisted
suicide laws in Glucksberg,151 State X can apply the principle set forth
in Giboney and validly punish speech which assists suicide of a specific
person, in violation of its valid statute. By sending B detailed instruc-
tions on how to hang herself, A has intentionally assisted or "taught" B,
a specific person, to commit suicide. Since B has completed suicide, the
requirements of State X's statute are fulfilled, and A's speech will fall
outside the protection of the First Amendment.
Assume, however, that A is a web master for a pro-suicide web
site, and that he has written and posted a file with very detailed in-
structions on completing various methods of suicide, including hang-
ing. There is no accompanying material advocating the right to choose
suicide. B accesses A's "how to hang yourself" instructions and com-
pletes suicide using the method A describes. The computer in the room
where B is found is still on, with A's instructions still on the screen.152
Whether A's speech is protected will turn on whether he has violated
the assisted suicide statute.
Both Barnett and Buttorff endorse the notion that if A intends the
instructions to be used to complete suicide, it is irrelevant how long B
waits after reading the material before she completes suicide. Further,
it is not important if A has had much personal contact with B, and it
does not even matter if A knows whether B has successfully completed
suicide. However, State X's statute requires A to assist a specific per-
son, B, in successfully completing suicide. Under these facts, it is doubt-
ful that A would be found to have violated State X's statute, because
while A may intend that the instructions be used to complete suicide,
he probably does not intend that B, specifically, use them. Therefore, in
this scenario, A's speech is most likely protected by the First Amend-
ment.
In sum, in interactive situations (such as an email, chat, text mes-
sage, or forum posting), where A provides B with specific suicide in-
151. See supra Part II.A.
152. These facts are taken from a Florida case. See Rebecca Sinderbrand, Point, Click and Die,
NEWSWEEK (U.S. Ed.), June 30, 2003, (Nat. Affairs), at 28, available at LEXIS.
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structions, which B then uses to complete suicide, A's speech is almost
certainly unprotected under the First Amendment. However, if B ac-
cesses A's instructions through a non-interactive format such as a
methods file posted on a web site, A will most likely escape any charg-
es under an assisted suicide statute which requires intent to aid a spe-
cific person in committing suicide.
B. Speech Which Encourages Suicide
Whether a state can punish cyber speech which merely encour-
ages suicide is less clear. First, because encouragement is a form of
advocacy, many courts will apply the Brandenburg test, and as set forth
below, under a strict application of Brandenburg, an assisted suicide
statute would almost certainly be held unconstitutional as applied to
cyber speech. Second, "encouragement" is a broad and somewhat
amorphous concept. While it is clear that the statement "I think you
should kill yourself," is a direct encouragement to suicide, encourage-
ment may also be indirect, or discernible only through a pattern of
repeated statements. For example, a suicidal person who is repeatedly
told that "suicide is the only way to end your pain," or "I don't know
why you're still alive," may eventually take those statements as en-
couragement to commit suicide.
Charges for encouraging suicide through speech are extremely ra-
re and convictions are almost non-existent. However, in a 1984 inci-
dent, a California man was charged with encouraging suicide for
yelling "Jump!" to a woman who was about to leap from a water
tank.153 Similarly, in 1990, a Canadian man was charged with aiding
suicide for encouraging a patron in a bar to shoot himself.154 It is un-
153. Around the Nation: Man is Held for Telling Student on Tank to jump, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1984.
154. Man Charged with Aiding Suicide, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 16, 1990, at A7, available
at WLNR 4557115. For other cases, see China Scene: East, CHINA DAILY, available at 2009 WLNR
4303799 (Mar. 3, 2009) (Chinese man arrested for encouraging man to jump from roof); Teenag-
ers in German Town Urge Woman Threatening Suicide to jump, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 19343148; Trial Delayed for Montreal Dad Charged With Pushing Kids to Commit
Suicide, CANADIAN PRESS, Oct. 24, 2006, 10/24/06 AP Alert-Crime 02:23:07, available at
WESTLAW; Thom Mrozek, Defendant in Assisted-Suicide Trial Knew of Victim's Past, Los ANGELES
TIMES, May 27, 1994, available at 1994 WLNR 4169359 (California man who knew roommate had
made previous suicide attempt on trial for assisted suicide for handing roommate shotgun and
telling him "Just do it."); Inga Saffron, Bar Bet Was After Hours, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 24,
1986, http://articles.philly.com/1986-12-24/news/26071465_1_bet-john-williamson-bar (offi-
cials considering assisted suicide or manslaughter charges against bar patrons and employees
after $70 bet led bar manager to drink himself to death); Teen-ager Sentenced on Charge ofAiding
in Suicide, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 7, 1985, 1/7/85 AP Online 00:00:00, available at WESTLAW
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known whether either case resulted in a conviction. However, in 2002,
a Welsh teenager was convicted of encouraging his girlfriend to com-
mit suicide by jumping from a cliff.15s According to the girl, who sur-
vived her attempted suicide, the boy told her that "my life was crap and
he didn't know why I was still alive. He was justgoing on and digging at
me-telling me he wanted me to be free."156 He also encouraged her to
jump off the bridge so that she could join the friend who had previous-
ly died there.157 In contrast, no charges were brought in two sensa-
tional cases where people watched suicides broadcast live on the
internet-and encouraged the suicidal people to go through with the
acts.158
Now assume that A, who lives in State X and knows B is suicidal,
sends B several emails over the period of a few days, encouraging her
to jump from the bridge near her house, and assuring her that suicide
is the only way to end her pain. Assume that the day after B receives
A's last email, she reads it again and, leaving it up on her computer
screen, goes to the bridge and jumps, successfully completing suicide.
In this scenario, A will argue that he cannot be held responsible for B's
death unless all elements of the Brandenburg test are met.
1. Illegal Advocacy
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,159 the Court overturned the conviction of
a Ku Klux Klan leader for violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute,
holding that a state cannot "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."16o Brandenburg was convicted of advocating the
(teenager who helped classmate prepare suicide note sentenced to year of probation and $2500
fine after pleading no contest).
155. Tania Branigan, Schoolboy Guilty of Trying to Get Girlfriend to Commit Suicide, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 29, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/jun/29/taniabranigan/print.
156. Tania Branigan, Suicide Case Boy 'Thrilled by Death,' GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 18, 2002,
available at 2002 WLNR 15228303. (emphasis added). She also remembers him "pushing her
towards the edge of the cliff." Id
157. Id.
158. See Jonathan Abel, As Teen Died, TheyJust Watched. How? ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29,
2008, at 1B, available at 2008 WLNR 22999461; Steven Wright, David Wilkes, & Beth Hale,
Chatroom Users 'Egged on Father to Kill Himself Live on Webcam,' MAIL ONLINE, last updated Mar.
23, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-444182/Chatroom-users-egged-father-kill-
live-webcam.html."
159. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
160. Id. at 447-448.
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use of violence against the government at a Klan rally for stating that if
the government "continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."161 The
Court criticized the Ohio statute for punishing the "mere advocacy" of
violence or the "teaching" of criminal syndicalism to achieve political
reform, as distinguished from advocacy that incites "imminent lawless
action."162 It explained that while "preparing a group for violent action
and steeling it to such action" can lawfully be punished, "the mere ab-
stract teaching... [of the] moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence" cannot.163
Because of the Court's failure to narrowly define the scope of "ad-
vocacy," lower courts have since applied the principle announced in
Brandenburg to facts far removed from political advocacy.164
In the scenario set forth above, A has encouraged B via email to
commit suicide by jumping off a bridge. The first prong of Brandenburg
requires that the speaker advocate "the use of force or of law viola-
tion." While it is possible that A could encourage someone to commit
suicide using a violent method (say shooting) or an unlawful method
(say purchase and use of a controlled substance), here A has encour-
aged B to jump off a bridge, a method which is arguably neither violent
nor unlawful. Similarly, if A encourages B to commit suicide without
recommending a particular method, no matter how persistently or
persuasively, A would not be liable for B's suicide, because suicide it-
self is not a "law violation" anywhere in the United States.165 However,
although suicide is no longer criminal, it is still disfavored and "wrong-
ful." This presents a dilemma. The act of encouraging a suicide is illegal,
yet if the encouragement takes the form of speech, it is not illegal un-
der Brandenburg. This is a wrong result, because it is inconsistent with
the intent of the law.
161. Id. at 446.
162. Id. at 448-449.
163. Id. at 448 (citing Noto v. United States., 367 U.S. 290 (1961)).
164. See, e.g., Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006)
(granting preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a statute criminalizing distribution of
video and computer games that appeal to minors' morbid interest in violence, on grounds that
they are protected expression under Brandenburg); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d
1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Brandenburg and holding that magazine article did not incite
adolescent to perform act that led to death by hanging); but see Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (declining to apply Brandenburg and holding that book Hitman was a
criminal instruction manual not protected by First Amendment).
165. See supra Section IlIl.A.
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As set forth in Part III.A, courts could relax the "illegal action"
prong so that it includes the "quasi-unlawful" act of suicide. This would
not be a great stretch. Suicide has been disfavored in western culture
for more than 700 years, and has been illegal for much of that time.
The fact that it is no longer illegal reflects a policy decision-that crim-
inalizing suicide will not effectively deter it, and will only burden the
suicide's family. If suicide were not still in some way "wrongful," as-
sisted suicide would not be criminalized. Therefore, modifying Bran-
denburg to allow the "quasi-unlawful" action of suicide to fulfill the
unlawful action requirement would be consistent with the historical
understanding of suicide as a crime, even though suicide today is no
longer criminalized.
However, even assuming the problem of "unlawful" action is over-
come, a problem with the imminence requirement will remain. A's
advocacy must be "directed to initiating or producing imminent law-
less action." To "direct" in this sense means to "cause (someone or
something) to move on a particular course."166 Thus, A's speech must
encourage B to commit suicide "imminently."167 The Brandenburg
Court gave no guidance on what qualifies as "imminent" action. How-
ever, in a later case the Court narrowed the time frame considera-
bly,168 and Kent Greenawalt calculates that "imminence" cannot be
more than a few hours.169 Thus, under the second prong of Branden-
burg, by sending B an email, A must intend to encourage B to commit
suicide within a few hours, at most. While it is possible that this might
occur in some situations, under the facts assumed here it is not clear
that A has a specific time frame in mind. A further complication is that
while speech in a chat room is in real time, the recipient of an email
may not read it immediately-possibly not for days. This could poten-
tially invalidate even a clear attempt to encourage a specific person to
commit suicide quickly. As discussed more fully in Section III.B.2, be-
low, while an "imminence" requirement makes absolute sense if the
Court's goal is to allow political speech the maximum latitude possible
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (8th ed. 2004).
167. According to BLACK'S, an imminent danger is "an immediate, real threat to one's safety
that justifies the use of force in self-defense." Id. at 421. It does not define "imminent" separately.
The SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 2007) defines "imminent" as "impending,
soon to happen."
168. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (reversing the disorderly-conduct convic-
tion of a demonstrator who yelled, "We'll take the fucking street later.").
169. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 209 (1989).
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before restraining it through criminal sanctions, it means little in the
context of a private email which advocates suicide.
Finally, under the third and final prong of Brandenburg, A's en-
couragement must be "likely to incite" B's suicide. How is this to be
judged? Because there is really no objective standard, a court would
have to determine it on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while some encour-
agements might satisfy this prong, it is clear that many of them proba-
bly would not. On the facts assumed here, it is arguable that A's emails,
taken as a whole, would be likely to encourage B, as a suicidal person,
to commit suicide.
Now assume that A, the webmaster of a pro-suicide forum, has
written and posted content on the site which encourages suicide. If
Brandenburg is strictly applied, it would be nearly impossible for the
State X statute to survive all three prongs of the test. In addition, A's
posting would probably not meet the requirements of the statute itself.
First, the statute requires intent to aid a specific person in taking her
life, and Brandenburg requires that the encouragement be directed to
encouraging unlawful action. Neither of these requirements is likely to
be satisfied by A's general statement, posted on a web site, encourag-
ing suicide. Second, if A posts content encouraging suicide on his web
site, he is likely to do so in the context of advocating for a specific
cause. For example, A's web site might encourage terminally ill persons
in great pain to end their lives rather than continuing to suffer. This
kind of speech would fall into the category of abstract advocacy, which
is protected under Brandenburg. Third, even if B reads A's web page
and immediately commits suicide, the timing and the connection
would be difficult to prove. Fourth, as previously discussed, a court
would have to be persuaded to modify the unlawful act requirement to
include the "quasi-illegal" act of suicide. Finally, A's encouraging web
page must be likely to cause suicide imminently. While it might be pos-
sible to show that B, for example, actually committed suicide within a
very short time after reading A's web page, the test requires that A's
encouragement be likely to cause suicide. Without a statistical study,
likelihood would be difficult to prove at best.
In sum, it is clear that if Brandenburg is strictly applied, only a
very small percentage of cyber suicide encouragements, if any, would
survive the analysis. Under Brandenburg, application of an assisted
suicide statute to cyber speech encouraging suicide is likely to be held
unconstitutional. However, there is a strong argument to be made that
2012]1 695
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Brandenburg should not apply to non-ideological speech like the pri-
vate emails between A and B.
2. Brandenburg Should Not Be Applied to Cyber Suicide Speech
Kent Greenawalt believes that "the values and dangers of encour-
agements to criminal behavior depend greatly on the context in which
they are uttered and on the reasons given to support them."17o He con-
tends that a stringent test such as the one set forth in Brandenburg
appropriately protects public, ideological speech which encourages
specific crimes, because the First Amendment value of such speech is
high.171 As Justice Luttig noted in Rice, the "right to advocate lawless-
ness is, almost paradoxically, one of the ultimate safeguards of liber-
ty.... Without the freedom to criticize that which constrains, there is
no freedom at all."172 Thus, public, ideological speech implicates one of
the fundamental rationales for protecting freedom of expression-the
right to self-governance.173 Moreover, unless the speaker is inciting the
imminent commission of a crime, the listener will most likely have the
opportunity to listen to opposing points of view and form her own
opinion on the course of action being advocated.
In contrast, Greenawalt believes that there is little reason to pro-
tect private, non-ideological encouragements to crime.174 For example,
if A privately encourages B to kill C, the communication has little ex-
pressive value, especially when weighed against the danger to C.175
Moreover, since B is unlikely to discuss what A has said to anyone else,
there will probably be no counter-speech which could influence B's
thinking.176 Since the opportunity for counter-speech is virtually nil,
the rationale for the Brandenburg imminence requirement becomes
essentially meaningless.177 Therefore, Greenawalt suggests that a more
appropriate way to evaluate whether a private, non-ideological en-
couragement to crime should be protected is simply to determine
whether A actually intended to encourage B in the commission of a
crime, and if so, whether he has effectively communicated that to B.178
170. Id. at 260.
171. Id. at 266.
172. Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.




178. Id. at 262.
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Although Greenawalt's analysis is confined to private speech
which encourages the commission of a crime, it can appropriately be
applied to private speech in which A encourages B to commit suicide
through a series of emails. Although suicide is no longer illegal, it is still
morally disfavored, and A is engaging in a criminal action by counsel-
ing suicide. Counseling suicide does not implicate one of the core First
Amendment rationales any more than counseling murder does. Thus,
the expressive value of A's communication urging B to commit suicide
is no greater than it would be if A were urging B to commit murder.
Similarly, the danger to B is great, especially in view of the fact that she
may feel incapable of or unwilling to discuss the idea of committing
suicide with anyone else. Moreover, even if B does discuss the idea of
committing suicide with someone else, she may be too fragile, vulnera-
ble or depressed for counter-speech to impact her thoughts or feelings.
Thus, there would be no reason to impose an imminence requirement
on A's communication to B.
Under Greenawalt's standard for private non-ideological speech,
as long as A's emails to B demonstrate a clear intention to encourage B
to commit suicide, A's speech would not be protected under the First
Amendment. Therefore, A could be held liable under an assisted sui-
cide statute such as State X's, consistent with the legislature's intent.
Since the State X statute requires A to intentionally encourage B to
commit suicide, Greenawalt's test is also consistent with the statutory
requirements set forth by the state. In contrast, as demonstrated
above, strict application of the Brandenburg test to speech which en-
courages suicide would fail, thwarting the legislature's intent to punish
assisted suicide.
Another approach courts might take to evaluating speech which
encourages suicide is to consider whether it is a new category of un-
protected speech.
3. United States v. Stevens: Historically Unprotected Speech
In United States v. Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts intimated that if
the Court were ever to recognize a new category of unprotected
speech, it would be one which had been "historically unprotected, but
[which had] not yet been specifically identified" as such by the
Court.179 In Stevens, the Court considered whether a federal statute
criminalizing the commercial creation, distribution, or possession of
179. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
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certain depictions of animal cruelty was facially invalid under the First
Amendment.18o Although Congress had enacted the statute to prohibit
"crush" videos, which showed small animals being tortured and killed
to satisfy a specific sexual fetish,181 Stevens had been convicted for
distributing videos of dogfights.182
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated Stevens' conviction and
struck down the statute, holding that it could not survive strict scruti-
ny.183 The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that the statute was
substantially overbroad, and thus invalid under the First Amend-
ment.184 The government argued that depictions of animal torture
should be recognized as a new category of unprotected speech because
they had little or no redeeming value.185 It proposed to evaluate
whether speech should be categorically unprotected by balancing "the
value of the speech against its societal costs."186 The Court rejected the
government's "startling and dangerous" proposal for evaluating unpro-
tected speech in the strongest possible terms,187 explaining that when-
ever "we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the
protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a
simple cost-benefit analysis."188 Rather, when determining that speech
is categorically unprotected, the Court "ground[s] its analysis in a pre-
viously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech,"
that is, speech which is "used as an integral part of conduct in violation
of a valid criminal statute."189 Thus, if speech which encourages suicide
is to become a new category of unprotected speech under the First
Amendment, it must fall into a category of speech which has historical-
ly been recognized as unprotected.
As the Court acknowledged in Glucksberg, assisted suicide has
been illegal for more than 700 years, and suicide itself was once con-
sidered "an Offence against Nature, against God, and against the
King."190 However, Stevens teaches that even if assisted suicide has
historically been prohibited, this alone is not enough to warrant a new
180. Id. at 1582.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1583.
183. Id. at 1584.
184. Id. at 1592.
185. Id. at 1584.
186. Id. at 1585.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1586.
189. Id.
190. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712, n.10 (1997).
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category of speech. Rather, the speech itself must also have been tradi-
tionally unprotected. As an example, the Stevens Court acknowledged
that animal cruelty had historically been prohibited.191 However, be-
cause there was no evidence that depictions of animal cruelty were
historically unprotected, the Court declined to recognize depictions of
animal cruelty as a new category of speech.192
At common law, suicide was a grievous wrong which "by [] exam-
ple and evil [] threaten[ed] and endanger[ed] the subversion of all civil
society."193 Life was a gift from God, who alone had the power to de-
stroy it. Thus, a person who committed suicide was guilty of self-
murder, "a double offense"-one against God, and the other "against
the king, who [had] an interest in the preservation of all his sub-
jects."194 As a result, suicide was ranked "among the highest crimes...
[as] a peculiar species of felony."195 At common law it was unlawful to
"counsel and solicit another to commit a felony or other aggravated
offense," even if the crime was not committed.196 Today, counseling or
soliciting a felony is still recognized as a substantive crime by most
COUrtS.197
Because suicide was historically a felony, one who advised or
counseled another to commit suicide was traditionally committing a
substantive crime. Although suicide is no longer a felony, it continues
to be "wrongful." Because suicide, though no longer illegal, is still high-
ly disfavored in our society, it is fair to class speech counseling or en-
couraging suicide with speech counseling a felony-as a traditionally
unprotected category of speech.
Since both assisted suicide and speech which counsels suicide
have been traditionally unlawful, based on the criteria laid out by Chief
Justice Roberts in Stevens, there is a strong possibility that the Court
would consider identifying speech which counsels suicide as categori-
cally unprotected under the First Amendment.
191. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
192. Id.
193. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *176, *176.
194. Id. at *189.
195. Id.
196. United States v. De Bolt, 253 F. 78, 81 (S.D. Ohio 1918).
197. Construction & Effect of Statutes Making Solicitation to Commit a Crime a Substantive




An assisted suicide statute as applied to cyber suicide speech has a
good chance of being upheld under strict scrutiny. In order to survive
strict scrutiny, the government must show that a content-based regula-
tion is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government inter-
est.198 For example, in Burson v. Freeman, a plurality of the Court up-
upheld a Tennessee statute which prohibited campaigning within 100
feet of a polling place.199 The challenger, a politician, asserted that it
limited her ability to communicate with voters.200 The state argued
that the statute advanced its compelling interests in "protecting the
rights of its citizens to vote freely" and ensuring the integrity of its
election process.201 The plurality agreed that the state's interests were
compelling.202 In addition, after a historical review of election proceed-
ings, it concluded that "restricted areas in or around polling places"
were necessary.203
For an assisted suicide statute to withstand strict scrutiny, the
state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide and protecting
abuse of vulnerable persons must be "compelling." Because neither
Glucksberg nor Cruzan was decided under strict scrutiny, the Court did
not use the word "compelling" in describing the state interests assert-
ed in these cases. Nevertheless, in considering whether Missouri had a
right to require clear and convincing evidence of Cruzan's wishes be-
fore withdrawing her from life support, the Court stated that
there can be no gainsaying [Missouri's] interest [in the protection
and preservation of human life]. As a general matter, the States-
indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to life
by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of
States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one
who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is re-
quired to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.204
Similarly, the Glucksberg Court stated that
[iun almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democra-
cy-it is a crime to assist a suicide. The States' assisted suicide bans
are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the
198. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 194.
201. Id. at 198-199.
202. Id at 199.
203. Id at 200.
204. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
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States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human
life.... [O]pposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore,
of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our
philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. 205
Reading the language of these opinions, with its emphasis on
"longstanding" and "enduring" values shared by "all civilized nations,"
it is hard to see how the Court today could decide that the preservation
of life and prevention of suicide are less than "compelling" state inter-
ests. However, establishing the existence of a compelling state interest
is just the first step; the government would still have the burden of
proving that its assisted suicide laws were narrowly tailored to ad-
vance its interests.
State X's assisted suicide law punishes anyone who aids a suicide
by "intentionally advis[ing], encourag[ing], or assist[ing] another in
taking the other's own life."206 As applied, then, this law punishes
speakers who intentionally advise, encourage or assist suicide, and
then only if the suicide is actually attempted or successfully completed.
Thus, it does not cover anyone who unintentionally encourages or as-
sists a suicide, even if a suicide is completed. Nor would it punish a
speaker if no link at all could be drawn between the speech and the
suicidal.207 Similarly, it would not cover anyone who intentionally en-
courages or assists a suicide, unless suicide is attempted or completed.
Thus, this law would seem to be narrowly tailored to preserve the life
of vulnerable, suicidal persons by punishing only the most serious cas-
es of assisting suicide-those which are actually intended to, and do
result in, a completed or attempted suicide. However, the Court might
take the analysis a step farther, by analyzing whether there are less
restrictive means available to advance the government's stated inter-
ests.
Because the Court considers the internet a public forum, it might
look to see if suicide prevention programs or blocking or filtering soft-
ware would be reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to punishing
suicide-related speech. These alternatives might achieve the govern-
ment's interests by insulating vulnerable people from harmful speech,
rather than by punishing it. However, while suicide prevention efforts
are important and families have some responsibility to protect their
most vulnerable members, the fact is that many of these protective
205. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-711 (1997).
206. Minn. Stat. § 609.215(1) (2011).
207. It is not clear whether State X courts would require the speech to be the "but for" cause
of the suicidal act. It can certainly be argued that narrow tailoring would demand this.
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measures are already in place, and have not effectively prevented vul-
nerable populations from easily accessing suicide-related cyber space.
Therefore, application of assisted suicide laws to cyber speech which
encourages suicide could have an incremental effect on saving lives
and preventing suicide. Above all, if states have decided to punish as-
sisting, encouraging or advising suicide, that behavior should not go
unpunished simply because it occurs in the form of online speech.
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, thousands of readily-accessible, pro-suicide
web sites have proliferated on the internet, allowing the exchange of
detailed information on suicide methods to flow unchecked through
message boards, chats and emails. Disturbing as this is, no current law
explicitly prohibits it. Unless action is taken, speech which would oth-
erwise be punishable will continue to flourish on the internet, circum-
venting traditional social controls. The majority of states have assisted
suicide statutes which could be used to prosecute cyber speech that
assists or encourages suicide. However, cyber suicide speech does not
fit neatly into existing categories of unprotected speech, and under the
current First Amendment test for illegal advocacy, punishment of
cyber-suicide speech is likely to be foreclosed by the First Amendment.
Because speech which is an integral part of a criminal action is not
protected, speech which aids suicide by teaching or instructing meth-
ods of suicide can constitutionally be punished. Because assisted sui-
cide has been illegal for more than 700 years, and speech counseling
suicide was a felony at common law, courts should acknowledge
speech which counsels or encourages suicide as a traditional category
of unprotected speech. Finally, because states have compelling inter-
ests in preserving life, preventing suicide and protecting vulnerable
persons from abuse, an assisted suicide statute as applied to cyber
suicide speech will have a good chance of surviving strict scrutiny.
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